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The Curious Policy Implications of In re 
SemCrude: Do Crude Oil Markets Need a 
Volcker Rule? 
By Joseph A. Schremmer 
Washburn Law Journal Online 
September 4, 2018 
In the summer of 2008 the nation's largest and fastest growing midstream crude oil 
purchaser, SemCrude, declared bankruptcy. SemCrude's demise was not the result of 
a bear market—crude oil traded on the NYMEX at $147 per barrel the month 
SemCrude filed—but of its taste for risky options trading. The bankruptcy pitted the 
competing liens of thousands of unpaid oil and gas producers and royalty owners 
who sold their crude oil to SemCrude at the wellhead against those of SemCrude's 
lenders and the claims of downstream purchasers. Producers from Texas, Kansas, 
and Oklahoma claimed prior perfected security interests and statutory liens under 
various nonuniform state amendments to Article. These were adopted specifically to 
protect producers from the insolvency of crude oil purchasers. The Bankruptcy Court 
for the Federal District of Delaware, however, found none of the producers' lien 
rights to be perfected under applicable law and awarded priority to SemCrude's 
lenders. Producers and royalty owners were left holding the bag. 
The dust has all but settled since the Third Circuit's July 2017 decision in In re 
SemCrude, 864 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017), affirming the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's 
ruling and further awarding priority to downstream purchasers of the oil over the 
producers. Yet little has been written about the decision's implications for the 
broader crude oil market. Only Oklahoma has acted to fix the flaw of its statutory lien 
identified in the litigation. And no one has attempted to reconcile the policy of the 
Third Circuit's decision—preservation of the free, unencumbered flow of crude oil in 
downstream commerce—with the rights and expectations of upstream crude sellers. 
This brief piece does not resolve the dilemma. It only hopes to frame the issue as a 
problem of systemic market risk like what ailed the financial sector preceding the 
2007 financial crisis. As with the financial crisis, this problem may be solvable partly 
by restricting speculation by midstream crude oil and natural gas purchasers similar 
to how regulators restrict speculation by federally insured banks under § 619 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, known as the "Volcker rule." 
A Snapshot of the Crude Oil Market 
Crude oil's path from underground to a gas tank involves many buyers and sellers. 
Mineral owners own the real property where the oil is originally in place. Because 
mineral owners generally lack the capital and expertise to extract the oil, they lease 
the land to specialized firms in exchange for a cost-free royalty, granting the lessee 
the right to produce and sell the oil. Oil producers contract with third-party 
purchasers to sell the produced crude. These buyers, called "midstream" companies, 
arrange for transportation of the oil (usually by pipeline) and sell it to downstream 
buyers to be refined and eventually retailed to end users. Midstream companies 
typically make a modest margin on transporting the product. At each step of the way 
sellers take the product on credit and make payment usually on the twentieth day of 
the following month. 
 
Midstream companies commonly hedge the value of the crude oil in their 
transportation systems by acquiring put options—the right to sell the oil at a 
specified price on a future date—to ensure they don't have to resell the oil for a loss. 
SemCrude, instead, sold call options giving the buyer the right to purchase oil from 
SemCrude at a specified price at a future date, essentially betting the price of oil 
would drop. In re SemCrude, 864 F.3d at 287. In an effort to grow profits quickly 
SemCrude took an enormous position in these options. As the price of oil kept rising 
SemCrude kept losing its bets and took additional loans to double down. It 
eventually buckled under margin calls. When it failed, SemCrude lacked the cash to 
pay producers for oil it purchased the previous month. 
 
In re SemCrude in a Nutshell 
 
Oil producers have endured midstream bankruptcies before. As a consequence, 
several oil and gas producing states (e.g., Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, North Dakota, 
and New Mexico) have laws giving producers a lien in crude sold to the first 
purchasers to secure payment. Texas and Kansas, for example, include a nonuniform 
provision in their versions of Article 9 granting producers an automatically perfected 
purchase money security interest in production. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.343; 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84-9-339a. Oklahoma law provides a statutory lien in favor of 
producers. 52 Okl. St. Ann. § 549.1, et seq. In the SemCrude bankruptcy, producers 
from these states asserted that liens perfected under their respective nonuniform 
state laws obtained priority over SemCrude's lenders and downstream purchasers. 
 
The Delaware Bankruptcy Court disagreed. Essentially the court found that under 
both Texas's and Kansas's versions of Article 9 perfection of the nonuniform PMSI 
was determined by the laws of the states where the debtors (SemCrude and its 
affiliates) were located—in this case, Oklahoma and Delaware. The drafters of revised 
Article 9 intend the uniform choice of law provision to eliminate uncertainty about 
how to perfect and where to file and search for financing statements. Neither 
Oklahoma nor Delaware adopted the nonuniform PMSI. Thus, the only means of 
perfecting the producers' security interests was to file a financing statement in the 
central filing office of the debtors' location; none of the producers had done so. As 
for the producers claiming priority under an Oklahoma statutory lien, the court 
simply noted the statute expressly subordinated the lien to Article 9 security 
interests. 
 
The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling and reasoning. For procedural 
reasons the appellate panel also held that the producers' security interests and liens 
were subordinate to the rights of downstream purchasers of the crude oil that 
enjoyed status as buyers for value and buyers in the ordinary course. The most 
striking aspect of the Third Circuit's opinion is its commentary on the nature of the 
downstream oil and gas market and the importance of keeping it free from sellers' 
encumbrances. "The oil industry operates through sales on credit. . . . The industry 
thus uses the Conoco warranty that this oil is sold free and clear of any liens because 
it is a hard-to-trace, liquid asset that flows throughout the country." Id. at 300. The 
court continued, "In sum, if any producer of oil tries to sell it subject to a security 
interest . . . that flows endlessly down the stream of commerce, it will be unsold. The 
Producers' contention that a lien . . . follows oil from their wells to the gas pump does 
not make sense for this type of market." Id. at 301. 
 
The Volcker Rule as a Model Solution 
 
On the one hand, producers and royalty owners shouldn't have to bear the risk of 
purchasers' insolvency unsecured. But on the other hand, assuming the Third Circuit's 
logic holds, the free flow of oil in the downstream market depends on it being sold 
on credit unencumbered by liens and security interests. Resolving this dilemma 
requires addressing the source of the problem—the midstream firm's insolvency. 
Crude oil and natural gas transportation companies routinely hedge the value of their 
crude oil to ensure they recoup their investment in it plus overhead and reasonable 
profit. But when does routine hedging become SemCrude-style speculation? 
According to Professor Emeritus Paul MacAvoy, it's "[w]hen you have a large open 
short position and not enough physical barrels to cover your short when the 
contracts expire." Another way midstream companies like Semcrude can get in 
trouble is to venture beyond mere futures contracts intended to hedge into call 
options intended to profit. 
 
Dodd-Frank's Volcker rule prohibits federally insured banks and their affiliates from 
engaging in proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds to limit the risk of 
failure of large financial institutions. The rule isn't without critics both for its drafting 
and its unintended consequences. Regardless it is the intent of the rule more so than 
the rule as written that provides a model for regulating midstream crude markets. 
That intent, according to the rule's namesake Paul Volcker, is to reduce systemic risk 
to the financial system by limiting high-risk trading activities by key banking 
institutions. 
 
A federal rule designed to limit high-risk trading by midstream oil and gas firms 
would reduce the risk of their insolvency. It would thus mitigate the largest risk 
facing producers of oil and gas in terms of payment for their product. Accordingly, it 
would reduce the compulsion oil and gas producing states feel to protect producers 
and royalty owners through nonuniform statutory liens and UCC provisions that 
might clog the otherwise free flow of oil in downstream commerce. Oklahoma's 
reaction to In re SemCrude, for example, has been to patch its statutory lien to 
prioritize it above Article 9 security interests. Other states are likely to follow suit 
unless a more efficient solution to systemic risk is found. 
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